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ROGUES' RIGHTS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE LIBEL-PROOF PLAINTIFF DOCTRINE
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing,
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the doctrine has not been codified, judges in
several jurisdictions have held that a person's reputation
may be so tarnished that it could not be lowered in the eyes of
the community. 2 Such persons are considered "libel-proof' as
a matter of law, and are thus precluded from bringing a libel
case to trial.3 A doctrine stating that a person is incapable of
being defamed denies that person due process and equal protection under the law.
Justifications for the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine are
deeply flawed. Identifying certain plaintiffs as beyond the
scope of libel law effectively makes these plaintiffs outlaws in
the classic sense,4 and American jurisprudence rejects out1.

RODNEY

A.

SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §

act 3, sc. 3

1.01 at 1-2 (1992) (quoting

in COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE: THE CAMBRIDGE TEXT 995, 971 (1980)).
2. See generally id § 9.10[4][d].
3. Defendants have successfully moved for dismissal or summary judgment on grounds that the plaintiff is libel-proof. See, e.g., Cardillo v. Doubleday
& Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975); Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618 (W.D.
Tenn. 1976), af/'d, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1977); and Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Cal. 1982). As recently as May 1993, a libel
case brought by convicted serial killer Randy Kraft was dismissed because the
trial court found Kraft libel-proof. Convicted Killer Says Book Defames Him,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 14, 1993, at 3B; Killer is 'Libel-Proof;Lawsuit
Dismissed, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 15, 1993, at 3B.
4. "The libel-proof plaintiff is an outcast of the law of defamation whose
reputation may be kicked and trod upon with impunity." SMOLLA, supra note 1,
§ 9.10[4][d] at 9-25. See also Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1988), in which the plaintiffs argued that applying the doctrine would
"declare open season on libel proof plaintiffs." Id. at 1081.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO
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lawry. Treating a person as beyond the scope and protection
of the law is contrary to the basic tenets of our society.'
Even without the judicially created libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine, defenses and privileges applicable to libel cases sufficiently protect First Amendment interests of defendants. If
a libel plaintiffs reputation is tarnished, the defendant publisher can assert truth as a defense, supplying evidence that
the allegedly defamatory statement is at least substantially
true in its implication.' If the plaintiff is a public official or a
public figure, the plaintiff cannot prevail absent a showing
that the defendant published the allegedly libelous statement
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether or not it was false. 7 Further, the plaintiff must
prove the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard with
convincing clarity.8 Given these substantial barriers to recovery in libel actions, there is simply no need to identify certain plaintiffs as libel-proof.
This comment traces the development of both the issuespecific and the incremental harm branches of the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine.' The comment then sets forth the central
question of a libel plaintiffs right of access to the courts, analyzing this question from the standpoint of due process and
equal protection. 10 Concluding that the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine violates fundamental constitutional rights, this comment proposes abrogation of the doctrine and suggests other
avenues open to libel defendants who wish to protect themselves against meritless claims.' 1

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Brief Overview of Libel Law

Defamation can be defined as a communication that excites adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions
5. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453, 457 (1969). The court

ruled that persons with criminal records "must be assured that they have a
stake in our society, and that they can achieve justice by application to the law
and its guardians." Id. at 457. See also infra text accompanying notes 184-88.
6. See Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 927 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
7. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
8. Id. at 285-86.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-161.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 179-261.

11. See infra text accompanying notes 262-72.
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against the plaintiff.12 Both written and oral communications may be actionable if defamatory; libel encompasses
13
written communications, and slander addresses oral ones.
As one commentator notes, an examination of the validity of a "slander-proof plaintiff doctrine" would differ substantially from a discussion of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, because slander actions differ from libel actions in significant
respects.' 4 The torts have different histories,' 5 and slander is
generally actionable only upon proof of actual, pecuniary
harm to the plaintiff.16 This comment is limited to a discussion of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine.
At English common law, libel was actionable even if the
plaintiff could not prove any impairment of reputation or
other harm as a result.' 7 Juries sometimes awarded substantial sums in compensation for the purported harm to the
plaintiffs reputation, even where no such harm was proven.',
Until the 1960's, American courts generally considered matter defamatory on its face and unambiguous to be actionable
per se; accordingly, harm was presumed.' 9
In recent years, however, American courts have narrowed the contours of the tort of libel in the interest of protecting free speech and freedom of the press. 20 Libel cases
require the courts to "chart the proper course between the
Scylla of inadequately guaranteeing First Amendment pro12. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 111 at 773 (5th ed. 1984). Keeton cites several definitions of defamation,
ranging from the narrow (communication that "tends to hold the plaintiff up to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided") to the
broad (communication that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from
associating with him"). Id. at 773-74.
13. Id. § 112 at 785.
14. David Marder, Note, Libel-ProofPlaintiffs-RabbleWithout a Cause, 67
B.U. L. REV. 993, n.3 (1987).
15. KEETON et al., supranote 12, § 112, at 785. Libel was criminal in origin,
and remains a common law crime, but slander was never criminal in itself, and
could only become criminal when the words constituted some other offense
(such as sedition, blasphemy, or breach of the peace). Id.
16. Id. § 112, at 793-94.
17. Id. § 112, at 795.
18. Id. See also Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50
T.L.R. 581 (1934) (jury awarded £25,000 to plaintiff, a Russian aristocrat, who
claimed that defendant's characterization of a Russian noblewoman seduced by
Rasputin libeled her).
19. KEETON, et al., supra note 12, § 112, at 795-96.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 24-40.
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tections and the Charybdis of diminishing an individual's
right to reputation."2 1 The courts have recognized a strong
interest in preventing or vindicating attacks on reputation,2 2
likening libelous speech to constitutionally unprotected
"fighting words." 23 Nevertheless, in the mid-1960's, the bal-

ance between plaintiffs' and defendants' interests in libel
cases began to shift in favor of defendants.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,24 the Supreme Court
found that libel laws could lead to self-censorship, thus deterring public criticism of official conduct. 25 To prevent such
censorship, the Court held that public officials could not recover damages for defamatory falsehoods relating to their official conduct absent proof that the statements were made
with "actual malice," which the Court defined as "knowledge
that [the statement] was false or . . .reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."26 Quoting Sweeney v. Patter-

son, the Court decreed that imposing liability for "erroneous
reports of the political conduct of officials reflect[s] the obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their governors ... ."28 Thus, after New York Times, a plaintiffs right to

recover damages in a libel action depended not only upon the
defendant's conduct, but also upon the plaintiffs profession
or role in society.

21. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
22. Marder, supra note 14, at 995 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86
(1966)).
23. See id. at 996 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942)).
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25. Id. at 279. The Court reasoned that a rule compelling critics of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions or else risk libel
judgments of potentially unlimited amounts would deter any such criticism. Id.
"The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is
inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
26. Id. at 279-80. Additionally, the Court reasoned, the Constitution mandates that actual malice be proven with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285-86. See
also, e.g., Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., No. 91-3948, 1993 WL 265034
(6th Cir. July 20, 1993), in which the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
granting of a directed verdict for the defendants because the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants acted negligently in their publication of the allegedly libelous statements.
27. 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942).
28. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272.
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The Court expanded the "Times malice" standard somewhat in Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts,29 where the plaintiff,
a college football coach, was merely a "public figure" and not
a public official.3 0 In Curtis, the Court held that such a public figure could recover damages for a defamatory falsehood
upon a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting
an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."31 Absent such extreme negligence by the defendant,
however, the public-figure plaintiff could not recover damages for libel.
The libel plaintiffs right to recovery was further circumscribed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 32 Although the Gertz

Court held that defamation of a private individual is not protected by constitutional privilege, it also sought to protect the
33
media from "the rigors of strict liability for defamation."
Ruling that the state interest in the protection of reputation
"extends no further than compensation for actual injury, " 31
the Court barred recovery of presumed or punitive damages
when liability is not based on Times malice. 5
Two years after Gertz, the Court was asked to define "actual injury" in the context of libel. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,36 the Supreme Court established that "actual injury"
encompasses not only harm to the plaintiffs reputation, but
humiliation and mental anguish as well. The Court held
that libel plaintiffs may recover damages for emotional dis29. 388 U.S. 130 (1967), conformed to Associated Press v. Walker, 418 S.W.
2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.), reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967), error refused, cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968). An article in the Saturday Evening Post accused
Butts of conspiring to "fix" a football game. Id. at 135.
30. Id. at 148.
31. Id. at 155.
32. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
33. Id. at 348.
34. Id. at 349.
35. Id. at 350. In justifying a high standard of proof for plaintiffs, the Court
reasoned that any liability system encompassing presumed and punitive damages could potentially "inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 349.
36. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
37. The plaintiff sued a magazine publisher for anxiety and concern resulting from a defamatory article about her divorce; the article erroneously claimed
she had been found guilty of adultery. Id. at 449-52. Although the plaintiff
could not show that her reputation had been harmed, the Court noted that emotional distress falls within the Gertz requirement of actual injury. Id. at 460.
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tress even though actual injury to reputation is minimal.38
Further, in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,3 9 the
Court ruled that plaintiffs may recover presumed and punitive damages if the libel does not involve matters of public
' 40
concern, "even absent a showing of 'actual malice. "'
In summary, public-official and public-figure plaintiffs
must prove "Times malice" (which can include extreme negligence) in order to recover in libel actions, and private-figure
plaintiffs must prove at least negligence. 4 1 Although the
plaintiff must meet a high standard of proof to recover damages for libel, damage to reputation is not the only ground for
recovery; emotional distress damages, presumed damages,
and punitive damages have also been awarded.4 2
B.

Development of the Libel-ProofPlaintiffDoctrine

The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine originated in Cardillov.
Doubleday & Co., Inc. 4 3 Cardillo, a prison inmate, sued the
authors and publishers of a book mentioning his alleged participation in various criminal activities.4 4 The court noted
that Cardillo had been convicted of several federal felonies in
Florida, Maryland, and New Hampshire, 45 as well as "numerous minor infractions of the law" in Massachusetts. 4 6 Additionally, the court found that Cardillo knowingly associated
with criminals and had been involved in several minor crimes
with one of the book's authors. 47 Accordingly, the Second Circuit declared, as a matter of law, that Cardillo was libel-proof
38. Id. at 460-61.
39. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Plaintiff sued Dun & Bradstreet for damages from
a highly inaccurate credit report, which the defendant failed to fully correct. Id.
at 751-52.
40. Id. at 761.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
43. 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 638. Thomas Renner and Vincent Teresa wrote the book, entitled
My Life In The Mafia. The book portrayed Teresa as a high-ranking figure in
organized crime, and Cardillo was mentioned in the book as participating in
specific crimes with Teresa, including a robbery and the fixing of a certain horse
race. Id. at 639-40.
45. These included bail-jumping, conspiracy, and interstate transportation
of stolen securities. Id. at 640.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court also cited testimony before a congressional committee regarding Cardillo's frequenting of a place where "'the mob generally hung out.'"
Id.
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for the purposes of this case; "i.e., so unlikely by virtue of his

life as a habitual criminal to be able to recover anything other
than nominal damages as to warrant dismissal of the case,
involving as it does First Amendment considerations." 48 The

court further opined that given Cardillo's record and associations, "we cannot envisage any jury awarding, or court sustaining, an award under any circumstances for more than a
few cents' damages,"49 even if Cardillo could prevail on the
legal issues.5 0 Thus, the court apparently discounted the possibility that Cardillo might have grounds for recovery other
than for damage to his admittedly besmirched reputation.
From its first articulation in Cardillo, the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine developed along two branches: the "issuespecific" branch and the "incremental harm" branch.5 ' Under
the issue-specific branch, a court may determine that a plaintiff's reputation is so tarnished with respect to a particular
issue that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is libel-proof regarding that issue. 52 By contrast, a court applying the incremental harm branch examines an entire communication to
determine the degree of harm inflicted by the allegedly
libelous statements.53 If the court finds that the actionable
statements cause the plaintiff no appreciable harm beyond
that caused by the non-actionable statements, the court may
dismiss the case. 54 The following sections trace the development of each branch of the doctrine.55
1.

The "Issue-Specific"Branch

A year after Cardillo was decided, the Second Circuit
confronted the libel-proof plaintiff defense in Buckley v. Lit48. Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir. 1975). The
court did not elaborate on the nature of the First Amendment considerations it
perceived here. Id. at 639-40.
49. Id. at 640.
50. Id.
51. See generally Note, The Libel-ProofPlaintiffDoctrine, 98 HARv. L. REV.
1909 (1985) [hereinafter The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine]. According to
Marder, the term "issue-specific" was first used in The Libel-ProofPlaintiffDoctrine and may be a misnomer. See Marder, supra note 14, at 993 n.4.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 56-119.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 120-61.
54. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1182 (1986).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 56-161.
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tell.56 Franklin H. Littell had written a book in which he
characterized William F. Buckley, Jr. as a "fellow traveler" of
totalitarians. 7 Littell claimed that Buckley's publications
printed items "picked up from the openly fascist journals
[and] repeat[ed] radical right malice and rumor."58

The

United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York entered a judgment for Buckley,5 9 and Littell
appealed.6 °
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the claim that
William F. Buckley, Jr. was libel-proof according to the ra6
tionale of Cardillo1.
Although the court found that Buckley
was a principal spokesperson for a controversial political position, it hastened to add that Buckley's reputation was one
that "could suffer under the onus of defamation."62 The court
reasoned that, like the victims of McCarthyism who had occupied prominent positions in broadcasting, Buckley's reputation could be damaged even though he had the communica63
tions resources to answer a false and defamatory attack.
According to the court, the libel-proof doctrine articulated in
Cardillo was "a limited, narrow one, which we will leave confined to its basic factual context." 4 Thus, the Second Circuit
appeared to restrict the doctrine to plaintiffs who are habitual criminals.6
56. 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
57. Id. at 884 & n.1 (quoting FRANKLIN LITTELL, WiLD TONGUES: A HAND-

(1969)).
58. Id. at 885 & n.1 (quoting FRANKLiN LITTELL, WiLD TONGUES: A HANDBOOK OF SOCIL PATHOLOGY (1969)).
59. Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
60. Id.
61. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977). Interestingly, the opinion was written by Judge Oakes, author of the opinion in Cardillo. Id. at 884.
62. Id. at 889.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The Cardillo reasoning was applied in Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp.
618 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1978), in which James Earl
Ray, a convicted felon and the confessed murderer of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
was held to be libel-proof as to defendant's article characterizing Ray as a "narcotics addict and peddler." Id. at 622. As "a convicted habitual criminal" unlikely to recover damages in light of his background and criminal activities, the
court dismissed Ray's action as frivolous. Id. See also Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978), where plaintiff, an admitted drug user
with an extensive criminal record, sued defendant for false statements concerning plaintiffs drug use. Id. at 1330. Citing Cardillo,the court held the plaintiff
BOOK OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY
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However, the United States District Court for the Central District of California extended the doctrine, applying it to
a plaintiff who was not a habitual criminal (but who had a
66
criminal record) in Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc.
Henry Wynberg had a "brief but celebrated 'close personal relationship'" with Elizabeth Taylor.67 The National Enquirer
published an article alleging that Wynberg had used this relationship for his own financial gain. 8 In its opinion, the
court asserted that Wynberg's prior criminal convictions,
which had been highly publicized, 69 damaged his general reputation sufficiently that he could recover "only nominal damages for subsequent defamatory statements."7 °
The Wynberg court conceded the difficulty of determining
the proper accommodation between libel law and First
Amendment freedoms, but noted that prior federal and state
decisions provided trial courts with "flexible rules" for resolving such conflicts. 71 The court decreed that when "an individual engages in conspicuously anti-social or even criminal behavior, which is widely reported to the public, his reputation
diminishes proportionately." 72 Abandoning the Cardillolimitation of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine to habitual
criminals, the Wynberg court reasoned that criminal or antisocial conduct diminishing a person's reputation could make
that person libel-proof as a matter of law regarding that specific conduct. 73 Eventually, according to the court, the person's reputation for specific conduct, or the person's general
libel-proof as a matter of law. Id. at 1332. But see Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987), in
which the Second Circuit expressly stated that the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine
is not limited to plaintiffs with criminal records. Id. at 303. See also infra text
accompanying notes 77-87.
66. 564 F. Supp. 924 (C.D.Cal. 1982).
67. Id. at 925.
68. Id. at 925 & n.3.
69. Id. at 928. Wynberg's convictions included contributing to the delinquency of minors involving sex and drugs, bribery, prostitution, grand theft,
and fraud. Id. at 928.
70. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 927-28 (C.D. Cal.
1982).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 928.
73. Id. One commentator was unconvinced that the court would apply the
libel-proof plaintiff doctrine in the absence of criminal behavior. According to
Marder, the court failed to clarify whether anti-social conduct that is not criminal could trigger the doctrine. See Marder, supra note 14, at 1001.
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reputation for honesty and fair dealing, could sink so low as
to render that person libel-proof on all issues.7 4 As to
Wynberg himself, the court found that due to his specific
criminal conduct and its attendant publicity, "it is beyond dispute.., that [Wynberg's] ... general reputation for integrity,
truth, honesty, and fair dealing in personal and business
matters is bad."75 Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion.7 6
In Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,77 the Second Circuit departed from its position in Buckley78 and declared that
the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is not confined to plaintiffs
with criminal records. 7 9 Robert Guccione, publisher of Penthouse magazine, sued Hustler Magazine over an article alleging that Guccione was married and also had a "live-in girlfriend, Kathy Keeton." 0 In "a boisterous trial that gave new
meaning to the term 'adversary proceeding,'" 8 1 Guccione contended that although he and Ms. Keeton had been living together during his marriage to Muriel Guccione, he and Mrs.
Guccione were divorced prior to the article's publication. 82
Guccione argued that because he had not been convicted of
the crime of adultery, he could not be held libel-proof regarding that issue.8 3 The court disagreed, ruling that plaintiffs
may be rendered libel-proof by evidence apart from criminal
convictions.8 4 Although the court conceded that "few plain74. Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 928 (C.D. Cal.
1982). As noted by Marder, supra note 14, at 1002, Wynberg directly contradicts the holding in Buckley, which limited the doctrine to cases in which a
plaintiff is libel-proof only regarding the specific issues on which the plaintiffs
reputation has been tarnished. Therefore, "Wynberg may represent a substantial expansion of the doctrine, rendering the term 'issue-specific' a misnomer in
this jurisdiction." Marder, supra note 14, at 1002.
75. Wynberg, 564 F. Supp. at 928.
76. Id. at 930.
77. 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
78. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977).
79. Guccione, 800 F.2d at 303.
80. Id. at 299. Magazines published by Guccione contained articles that
advocate extramarital sexual relations. Id. at 300.
81. Id. at 299.
82. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 299 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
83. Id. at 303.
84. Id. In particular, the court noted Guccione's testimony that from 1966
until 1979, his relatives, friends, and business associates knew he was living
with Ms. Keeton while still legally married. Id. at 304.
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tiffs will have so bad a reputation that they are not entitled to
obtain redress for defamatory statements,"8" it had little
sympathy for those unfortunate few plaintiffs. The court reasoned that "where an allegedly libelous statement cannot realistically cause impairment of reputation, . . . the claim

should be dismissed so that the costs of defending against the
impair vigorous freedom
claim of libel, which can themselves
86
of expression, will be avoided."

The Guccione court noted that Guccione had not restored
his reputation between the time the Hustler statements
would have been true and the time the article was actually
published, 7 thus raising the question of how recent a libelous
statement must be to have a perceived impact on the plaintiffs reputation. The Fifth Circuit addressed this question in
Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers,Inc."" In Zerangue,two Louisiana law enforcement officers sued a newspaper publisher
over two articles erroneously stating that the officers had
been convicted of felonies rather than of misdemeanor malfeasance.8 " The articles appeared nearly six years after the
convictions. 90 Defendant TSP Newspapers argued that the
plaintiffs, as law enforcement officers stripped of their offices
and jailed, were libel-proof; the plaintiffs replied that in the
intervening six years, they had restored their reputations. 91
The Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed the trial court's holding
that whether or not the plaintiffs were libel-proof was a question for the jury.9 2 Courts have admitted articles published
as much as eight years before the fact to show that a plaintiff
is libel-proof,93 leaving unanswered the question of when, if
ever, a plaintiffs tarnished reputation could be deemed
rehabilitated.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 303. The court decreed that in libel-proof plaintiff cases, even
nominal damages may not be awarded. Id.
87. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
88. 814 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 1067-69.
90. Id. at 1068-69.
91. Id. at 1074.
92. Id.
93. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir.
1991) (citing Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 304 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987)).
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Not all federal courts have embraced the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine. The Third Circuit declined to apply the issue-specific branch of the doctrine in Marcone v. Penthouse
International Magazine for Men.94 In 1976, Frank J. Marcone, an attorney who represented motorcycle gangs, 95 was
indicted by a grand jury for conspiring to possess marijuana
with intent to distribute.96 The charges were subsequently
withdrawn, 97 but in 1978, Penthouse published an article including Marcone in a list of "attorney criminals." 98 On appeal
from a judgment in Marcone's favor, Penthouse argued that
Marcone's highly publicized drug indictment, his notorious
relationship with motorcycle gangs engaged in illegal activity, and his widely reported 1978 trial for income tax evasion
made him, in effect, libel-proof before the publication of the
allegedly libelous statement and therefore entitled only to
nominal damages. 99 Rather than declaring Marcone libelproof, however, the Third Circuit ruled that "[e]vidence of a
tarnished reputation is admissible and should be considered
as a factor to mitigate the level of compensatory damages."100
The court found that the jury had been informed of the evidence regarding Marcone's reputation, and that its verdict for
compensatory damages of $30,000 may have reflected Marcone's diminished status as of 1978.101
In Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos.,102 the Sixth

Circuit also declined to apply the issue-specific branch. ABC
television personality Geraldo Rivera traveled to Akron, Ohio
to investigate rumors concerning a local judge's alleged corruption. 0 3 Rivera suspected that William G. Brooks, an Akron resident with a substantial and slightly publicized crimi94. 754 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
95. Id. at 1076. Marcone also associated with these gangs "on a non-professional basis." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. An assistant United States Attorney said the charges were dropped
because of "'legal technicalities' tying Marcone to the larger conspiracy" involving defendants in the United States and Canada. Id.
98. Id. at 1077. The article also stated that the charges against Marcone
were dropped because he cooperated with further investigations. Id.
99. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1078-79
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
100. Id. at 1079.
101. Id. at 1077, 1079.
102. 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 496. These rumors stated that the judge persuaded women to
have sex with him in exchange for favorable rulings in certain cases. Id.
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nal record, was assisting the judge by intimidating those who
might testify against the judge.1 °4 A 1980 episode of ABC's
20 /20 broadcast Rivera's and others' negative remarks about
Brooks, to the effect that Brooks was the judge's "hitman,"
and that Brooks was a "pimp," a "muscleman," and a "street
knowledgeable jive turkey." 10 5 The district court granted
ABC's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with ABC
that Brooks was libel-proof as a matter of law.10 6 On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit called the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine "a
rather loose-woven legal conception of the federal courts," ' 07
indicating that "we may question whether all aspects of the
libel proof doctrine are sound policy." 0 8 Regrettably, the
Brooks court did not address the policy questions (most notably the question of whether protecting free speech justifies
placing anyone outside the protection of the law), as the court
found genuine issues of material fact that justified allowing
the case to go to a jury. 0 9
Only the District of Columbia Circuit flatly rejects the
doctrine. In Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 1 0 Liberty Lobby
and its founder and treasurer, Willis Carto, sued Jack Anderson for writing and publishing three articles that were allegedly libelous."' The articles characterized Carto as "racist,
fascist, anti-Semitic, and a neo-Nazi," and indicated that Liberty Lobby was established to pursue Carto's goals." 2 The
104. Id.
105. Id. at 496-97.
106. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 737 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio),
aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991).
107. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.
1991).
108. Id. at 501.
109. Id. at 502. While Brooks was known to some people as an occasionally
violent criminal, the court found that "no popular nationwide television program or other publicity had portrayed Brooks as a 'hitman' for a corrupt judge,
a 'pimp,' a 'muscleman,' or a 'street knowledgeable jive turkey.' We leave it to a
trier of fact to determine whether, and to what extent, the '20/20' episode damaged Brooks' reputation." Id. On remand, at the conclusion of Brooks' evidence,
the defendants moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that Brooks had
failed to prove fault-an essential element of his case. Brooks v. American
Broadcasting Cos., No. 91-3948, 1993 WL 265034, at *1-2 (6th Cir. July 20,
1993). The district court's directed verdict was affirmed on appeal. Id.
110. 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on othergrounds, 477 U.S. 242
(1986).
111. Id. at 1565-66.
112. Id. at 1567.
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district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, finding the plaintiffs libel-proof.113
On appeal, the defendants argued both the issue-specific
and the incremental harm theories of the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine.1 1 4 As to the issue-specific branch, the defendants
contended that the reputations of Liberty Lobby and Carto
had been irreparably damaged by prior publications, thus
rendering them libel-proof.1 1 5 Writing for the majority, thenDistrict Court Judge Scalia denounced the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine as a "fundamentally bad idea."116 Judge Scalia
opined, "we cannot envision how a court would go about determining that someone's reputation had already been 'irreparably' damaged- i.e., that no new reader could be reached
by the freshest libel." 1 7 He also asserted that no significant
1 18
First Amendment interests are furthered by the doctrine,
declaring that the doctrine is neither part of the law of the
District of Columbia nor part of federal constitutional law.' 19
2.

The "IncrementalHarm" Branch

Under the incremental harm branch of the doctrine, a libel case may be dismissed if non-actionable statements
within an article damage a plaintiffs reputation so greatly
that the harm caused by the actionable statements is minimal.' 2 0 This branch of the doctrine was first articulated in
113. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 562 F. Supp. 201 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
114. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
115. Id. at 1568. See infra text accompanying notes 141-46 for a discussion
of the court's treatment of the defendants' incremental harm theory.
116. Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1569.
117. Id. at 1568.
118. Id.
119. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C.Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
120. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991);
Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182
(1986); Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
A statement may be non-actionable for reasons other than its substantial
truth. For example, in Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069 (3d
Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs argued that they had valid reasons, including limited
resources and quality of evidence, for challenging only the last portion of the
magazine article at issue, and they had no intention of conceding that the rest
was true. Id. at 1080 n.13.
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Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.' 21 Plaintiff Simmons Ford was a retailer of the CitiCar,
one of two electric cars that received a highly critical review
in the October 1975 issue of Consumer Reports.122 Consumers Union's Auto Test Division rated the CitiCar "Not Acceptable" based on the car's poor acceleration, low top speed, poor
braking, poor handling, and poor ride, among other
problems. ! 23 The Auto Test Division submitted its findings to
the defendant's editorial office,1 24and the published article included many of these findings.

The only portion of the article Simmons Ford challenged
was the portion describing the CitiCar as unsafe for the particular reason that it did not meet allegedly mandatory federal safety regulations. 25 Simmons Ford did not contend
that the CitiCar could meet these tests; it merely argued that
the alleged mandatory requirements did not exist for conventional cars, and therefore the article was false.' 26 Granting
summary judgment for the defendants, the court ruled that
"[g]iven the abysmal performance and safety evaluations detailed in the article, plaintiffs could not expect to gain more
than nominal damages based on the addition to the article of
121. 516 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). One author contends that Simmons
Ford is a product disparagement action, not a libel case. Marder, supra note 14,
at 1015. "Libel actions ... are not limited to pecuniary harm and thus require
an entirely different analysis from product disparagement actions. Reliance on
Simmons Ford is therefore entirely misplaced and exemplifies the confusion
surrounding this anomalous body of law." Id. at 1015.
122. Simmons Ford at 743-44.
123. Id. at 744 (quoting Two Electric Cars, CONSUMER REP., October 1975, at
596). The Test Division chief stated that the car was "'an extremely dangerous
and unsafe vehicle, wholly unsuited for transportation on the public highway,
and raising a genuine threat of serious injury or death to any person foolhardy
enough to drive one.'" Id. (quoting affidavit of Robert D. Knoll 31, Simmons
Ford v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 516 F. Supp 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (No. 801901)).
124. Id.
125. Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 742,
745 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The regulations required life-saving protection to occupants in a 30-mph barrier crash, a 30-mph rollover, and a 20-mph side impact.
After citing these regulations, the article stated, "'[wie believe any such crash
would imperil the lives of persons inside these tiny, fragile, plastic-bodied vehicles.'" Id. at 744-45 (quoting Two Electric Cars, CONSUMER REP., October 1975,
at 596).
126. Id. at 745. Later, the magazine printed a correction of its statement
regarding the federal safety standards, but it reiterated its "'Not Acceptable'"
rating on the other safety grounds detailed in the article. Id. at 746 (quoting
CONSUMER REP., October 1976, at 573).
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the misstatement relating to federal safety standards." 2 7
The court stated that Simmons Ford's reputational interest
in averting further negative comment regarding the safety
and performance of the CitiCar was "minimal when compared with the First Amendment interests at stake." 28
The Second Circuit adopted the incremental harm
branch of the doctrine in Herbert v. Lando.129 In Herbert,the
plaintiff claimed that eleven statements made by the defendants were libelous and made with "Times malice." 3 0 On a
motion for summary judgment, the district court had found
nine of the statements non-actionable because there was no
evidence that these statements had been made with actual
malice. 13 1 On appeal, the Second Circuit evaluated the remaining two statements under the incremental harm branch
of the doctrine, and dismissed the case. 1 32 The court decreed
that "[fior Herbert to base his defamation action on subsidiary statements whose ultimate defamatory implications are
themselves not actionable ... would be a classic case of the
"133
tail wagging the dog.
Two years after Herbert,the Third Circuit confronted the
incremental harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine
in Schiavone ConstructionCo. v. Time, Inc. 134 An article published by Time magazine reasserted Ronald Schiavone's
widely reported underworld connections and stated that
Schiavone's name appeared several times in the FBI files on
Jimmy Hoffa's disappearance. 13 5 Schiavone brought a libel
action against Time on the basis of the last paragraph of the
article, 1 3 6 which contained the information about the FBI
files.'3 7 The district court granted the defendant's summary
judgment motion because, among other grounds, it ruled that
Schiavone and the other plaintiffs suffered no more than incremental damage from the unchallenged portion of the arti127. Id. at 750.
128. Id. at 751.
129. 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
130. Id. at 304. The eleven challenged statements are listed in the appendix
to the opinion. Id. at 313-14.
131. Id. at 304-07.
132. Id. at 312.
133. Id.
134. 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).
135. Id. at 1072.
136. Id. at 1075.
137. Id. at 1074.
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cle.'13 On appeal, the Third Circuit explicitly declined to rule
on the viability of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, holding
that depending on how a jury evaluated the sting of the article, Schiavone might be able to recover compensatory dam139
ages and thus could not be libel-proof as a matter of law.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court attacked this
branch of the doctrine in Liberty Lobby. 140 In the majority
opinion, then-Judge Scalia wrote that the apparently equitable incremental harm doctrine "loses most of its equity when
one realizes that the reason the unchallenged portions are
unchallenged may not be that they are true, but only that
[plaintiffs] were unable to assert that they were willfully
false."' 4 ' The court rejected the incremental harm doctrine
because "it rests upon the assumption that one's reputation is
a monolith, which stands or falls in its entirety." 42 According to Judge Scalia, the law either presumes that "there is a
little bit of good in all of us, [or, alternatively, presumes that]
no matter how bad someone is, he can always be worse."' 43
Judge Scalia went on to state that "[i]t is shameful that Benedict Arnold was a traitor; but he was not a shoplifter to boot,
that charge while
and one should not have been able to make
44
knowing of its falsity with impunity."1

Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has adopted only the incremental harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine,
applying it in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,Inc. "4s Jeffrey
Masson, a Sanskrit scholar and psychoanalyst, served for a
time as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives in
England. 46 Shortly after assuming his post, he became disenchanted with Freudian psychology and began advancing
his own theories regarding Freud. 147 Approximately one year
138. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1511 (D.N.J. 1986),
aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).
139. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1075 (3d Cir. 1988).
140. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568-69 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

141. Id. at 1568.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.

145. 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2419
(1991).
146. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991).
147. Id. Specifically, Masson advanced his theories in 1981 at a lecture
before the Western New England Psychoanalytical Society in New Haven, Connecticut. Id.
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after his being hired, the Board of the Archives terminated
Masson as Project Director. 148 Janet Malcolm, an author and

contributor to The New Yorker, contacted Masson about the
possibility of an article on his relationship with the
Archives. 149 Masson agreed, and he spoke with Malcolm in a
series of interviews. 5 0 Malcolm's article included lengthy
passages enclosed in quotation marks and attributed to Masson, even though the passages were not exact quotes. 5 ' The
work portrayed Masson unflatteringly, and he sued Malcolm
for libel in the District Court for the Northern District of
California. 152
At trial, the district court held that the alleged inaccuracies did not raise a jury question, as they were either substantially true or were rational interpretations of an ambiguous conversation and thus entitled to constitutional
protection. 53 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
summary judgment for defendants, applying the incremental
harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and concluding that "[g]iven the ... many provocative, bombastic statements indisputably made by Masson and quoted by Malcolm,
the additional harm caused by the 'intellectual gigolo' quote
was nominal or nonexistent, rendering the defamation claim
as to this quote non-actionable."' 54 The United States
Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to discount the possibility that this quote could have harmed Masson's reputa148. Id.
149. Id. The article appeared first in The New Yorker Magazine and was
subsequently published as a book by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Id. at 2425.
150. Id. at 2424.
151. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2425-28 (1991).
For example, Malcolm quoted Masson describing the role he played, in his relationship with Dr. Kurt Eissler (head of the Sigmund Freud Archives) and Dr.
Anna Freud (daughter of Sigmund Freud), as that of an "'intellectual gigolo you get your pleasure from him, but you don't take him out in public.'" Id. at
2424-25 (citation omitted). Tape recordings of this interview show that Masson
actually said, "[they felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a public liability.... They liked me when I was alone in their living room,.... [b]ut I was...
much too junior within the hierarchy ... for these important training analysts
to be caught dead with me." Id. at 2426 (citation omitted).
152. Id.
153. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), affd, 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989), modified, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th
Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
154. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1541 (9th Cir.
1989), rev'd and remanded, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
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tion.'15 The Court found that Masson was entitled to argue
that the quote falsely purported to represent the views of
could be more damMasson's senior colleagues, and as such
156
self-appraisal.
aging than a similar
The Supreme Court expressed reservations concerning
the Ninth Circuit's application of the incremental harm doctrine, explaining that the Ninth Circuit's "reasoning requires
a court to conclude that, in fact, a plaintiff made the other
quoted statements and then to undertake a factual inquiry
into the reputational damage caused by the remainder of the
publication. " 1 57 Moreover, the Court pointed out that the
Ninth Circuit had not indicated whether it considered the incremental harm branch of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine to
be grounded in California law or the First Amendment. 158 To
the extent that the Ninth Circuit had based its ruling on the
the Supreme Court tersely noted that "it
First Amendment,
was mistaken." 5 9 While stating that "we are given no indication that California accepts this doctrine, though it remains
free to do so,"' 6 0 the Court emphatically "reject[ed] any suggestion that the incremental harm doctrine is compelled as a
matter of First Amendment protection for speech."16 1 Thus,
the Court's decision in Masson seriously undercuts any constitutional justification for the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine.
C. Access to the Courts
Both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments provide
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
155. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2435-36 (1991).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2436 (citation omitted). The Court noted that "the most 'provocative, bombastic statements' quoted by Malcolm are those complained of by petitioner, and so this would not seem an appropriate application of the incremental harm doctrine." Id. (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d
1535, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2436.
160. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).
161. Id. The Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at
2437. Justice White concurred in part and dissented in part, filing an opinion
in which Justice Scalia joined. Id. This dissent does not address the constitutionality of the incremental harm doctrine, but states that if, as a matter of law,
reasonable jurors could not conclude that falsely attributing quotes to Masson
amounted to libel, a motion for summary judgment on this ground would be
justified. Id. at 2438.
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without due process of law. 16 2 The Fourteenth Amendment
also provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' 6 3 While no Constitutional provision explicitly requires the federal government to provide
equal protection of the laws, the United States Supreme
Court has held that where the federal government makes a
classification which, if made by a state, would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, such a
classification violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause-a clause that is directly applicable to the federal
64
government. 1
The issue of access to the courts has been analyzed both
as a due process question 16 5 and an equal protection question. 1 66 An equal protection analysis implicitly incorporates
the due process question in libel-proof plaintiff cases. The
classification of plaintiffs as "libel-proof' by a federal judge
raises equal protection scrutiny of the classification itself; if
such a classification violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, it also violates the Fifth Amend167
ment's Due Process Clause.
A fundamental principle of equal protection law is that a
classification must treat similarly those persons who are similarly situated. 168 In determining whether a classification violates the Equal Protection Clause, three factors are considered: (1) the character of the classification in question; (2) the
individual interests affected by the classification; and (3) the
162. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV, § 1.
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
164. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Bolling Court held that
racial segregation of District of Columbia public schools violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause because the segregation was not reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective and was therefore an arbitrary
deprivation of black students' liberty. Id. at 500. Such segregation by the
states would be unconstitutional, so the Court reasoned that "itwould be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government." Id.
165. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545 (1965).
166. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
167. See supra text accompanying note 164.
168. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). "[Tlhe
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary.... so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 415.
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governmental interests asserted in support of the classification. 1 6 9 Traditionally, cases affecting economic and commercial interests are subject to a lenient standard of judicial review. 170 In such cases, governmental action is typically
upheld if the action is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.171 However, if a classification is considered "suspect" (such as a classification by race), or if the individual interest affected is considered "fundamental," the governmental action is subject to strict scrutiny-that is, the action will
not be upheld unless the action is necessary to promote a com72
pelling state interest.'
At a minimum, due process requires that "absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard."1 73 Because due process is explicitly guaranteed by
the Constitution, 74 it is a fundamental right for purposes of
Equal Protection Clause analysis. 7 5 A state's denial of a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny under Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, even where the denial is not
based on a suspect classification such as race, nationality, or
alienage. 76 One commentator notes that "[s]uch inequalities
are particularly injurious when they interfere with either of
the two major sources of political and legal legitimacynamely, voting and litigating-or with the exercise of inti-

169. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1971).
170. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
171. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
172. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971). In Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977), the Court articulated
an intermediate level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications. Id. at 197.
Under this level of scrutiny, "classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives." Id.
173. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. V & amend. XIV, § 1.
175. Rights either implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution are
considered "fundamental" by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973), reh'g denied,
411 U.S. 959 (1973). "[Tlhe right to due process reflects a fundamental value in
our American constitutional system." Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374.
176. Graham, 403 U.S. at 365.
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mate personal choices."17 7 Denying libel plaintiffs access to

the courts denies them due process and equal protection.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Statement of the Problem

Traditional analysis of defamation balances the individual's right to reputation against society's right to free speech
and a free press. 171 When a plaintiff is declared libel-proof,
however, the defendant's right to free expression must be bal-

anced against the plaintiffs right to due process and equal
protection under the law. Courts have not directly addressed
this conflict.
B.

Due Process and Equal Protection Considerations
1.

Characterof the Classification

The Equal Protection Clause has been construed to apply
to classifications by race, 1 7 9 alienage, 8 0 poverty,"8 and class
or caste.'8 2 The libel-proof plaintiff classification falls within
the last category. By ruling that the plaintiffs character may
be attacked with impunity, the court, in effect, declares the
177. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTToNAL LAw § 16-7 (2d ed.
1988).
178. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
179. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating state law
prohibiting cohabitation by interracial married couples); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (invalidating state law restricting jury membership
to white males).
180. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidating state law denying commercial fishing licenses to aliens).
181. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that a state must provide a trial transcript or its equivalent to an indigent criminal defendant appealing the conviction).
182. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a state law
permitting forced sterilization of "habitual criminals"). Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act provided for the sterilization of any person who, having been convicted two or more times for felonies involving moral turpitude,
was thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and sentenced to imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution. Id. at 536. The Court found that
sterilization of those who have committed grand larceny three times, with immunity for those who are embezzlers, amounts to "aclear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination" that runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 541.
Given this holding, even habitual criminals do not forfeit their right to equal
protection.
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plaintiff to be an outlaw-one outside the protection of the
law. 183
American jurisprudence has rejected the creation of an
outlaw class. 184 In Davis v. United States,185 for example, the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the trial court properly
excluded evidence of a robbery victim's own convictions for
assault, felonious assault, and rape. The court reasoned that
admitting such evidence for the purpose of impeaching the
complainant creates a risk that the jury will "acquit a man
plainly guilty of crime because of their distaste for the victim.
They may, for example, conclude that an established rapist is
not one to complain ... of a robbery."1 8 6 Additionally, the
court found that persons with prior criminal convictions
"must be assured that they have a stake in our society, and
that they can achieve justice by application to the law."1 87 To
indicate otherwise, the court admonished, "would tend to go
contrary to our society's basic tenets, by establishing a kind of
outlaw, outside the protection of the law." 88
In libel-proof plaintiff cases, discrimination according to
this "outlaw" status is particularly egregious, because the label is applied by only one judge. Evaluation of reputation is
inherently subjective; without a jury to assess the plaintiffs
reputation in the community, the judge's ruling could easily
be arbitrary and capricious. Thus, although the "outlaw"
classification falls outside the more traditional suspect classifications of race and alienage, it arguably leads to discrimination repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause.
To determine how much harm a plaintiff must allege in
order to bring a libel claim to a jury, the judge must subjec183. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *319-20. A person adjudicated to be "outlawed" was "put out of the protection of the law, so that he is
incapable of taking the benefit of it in any respect, either by bringing actions or
otherwise." Id. at *319. Prior to Blackstone's time, an outlawed felon was "said
to have caput lupinum, and might be knocked on the head like a wolf by any one
that should meet him, because, having renounced all law, he was to be dealt
with as in a state of nature." Id. at *320.
184. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1969); People v.
Epps, 334 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1975). See also Teresa Stanton Collett, Understanding Freedman's Ethics, 33 ARIz. L. REV. 455, 457 (1991). "The law no
longer brands a person 'outlaw,' literally casting that person beyond the protection of the law." Id.
185. 409 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
186. Id. at 457.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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tively decide what is part of the same "issue" or how much
damage is merely "incremental.""8 9 No clear guidelines exist
for these distinctions. As formulated in Cardillo, the libelproof plaintiff doctrine applied originally to "habitual
criminals."' 90 However, the Cardillocourt did not set forth a
standard for determining how many, or what types of, offenses render a person's criminality sufficiently "habitual" to
trigger the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine. Consequently, even
courts that have applied the doctrine to some plaintiffs with
significant criminal records have hesitated to apply it to
other such plaintiffs. For example, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the Western District Court of Tennessee that
James Earl Ray was libel-proof,' 9 ' but it declined to apply the
doctrine to William Brooks, who also had a criminal past.' 92
Brooks had been taken into police custody 20 times over the
years and had been convicted of numerous felonies, 9 3 but instead of declaring Brooks a libel-proof habitual criminal, the
Sixth Circuit found genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the 20/20 broadcast damaged his reputation. 9 4
Without adequate guidelines for its application, the libelproof plaintiff classification is inherently arbitrary, even
within its original context of plaintiffs who are "habitual
criminals."

95

Outside the criminal context, the libel-proof plaintiff
classification is even more arbitrary. As to the issue-specific
branch of the doctrine, the Second Circuit held that William
189. The Libel-Proof PlaintiffDoctrine, supra note 51, at 1924. One commentator asks:
For example, does being termed a "child molester" in addition to a "rapist" add significant or only incremental damage to the plaintiffs reputation? Or a "crook" and a "liar"? The same questions also arise in the
issue-specific context, with the focus appropriately shifted to the plaintiff's reputation instead of the communication itself.
Id. at 1925-26.
190. Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (1975).
191. Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), affd 582 F.2d
1280 (6th Cir. 1978).
192. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1991).
193. Brooks' criminal convictions included breaking and entering, grand larceny, first-degree manslaughter, and carrying a concealed weapon under a disability. Id. at 497.
194. Id. at 501-02.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 43-55.
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F. Buckley, Jr., a conservative idealogue, 1 96 was not libelproof on the issue of his alleged membership in the "radical
right."19 v However, the Second Circuit also held that Robert
Guccione, a similarly outspoken advocate of extramarital
sex, 1 98 was libel-proof on the issue of his purported adultery.19 9 As to the incremental harm branch, the Third Circuit
held that a reasonable jury could have found that Ronald
Schiavone had suffered more than incremental harm from
the portion of an article alleging that Schiavone's name appeared in FBI reports on the disappearance of Jimmy
Hoffa, 20 0 even though Schiavone did not challenge the portions of the article reporting his ties to the Mafia. 2 ° ' Yet the
Second Circuit held that because Anthony Herbert, whom defendants Barry Lando and Mike Wallace had accused of lying
about reporting war crimes, could not prove that nine of
eleven challenged statements were published with actual
malice, Herbert could not ask a jury to evaluate the harm
caused by the two remaining statements, even if those two
statements were published with the requisite malice.20 2
Thus, in either the criminal or the non-criminal context, and
under either the issue-specific or the incremental harm
branch of the doctrine, the libel-proof plaintiff classification
does not treat similarly those plaintiffs who are similarly
situated.
2.

Individual Interests Affected by the Classification

Everyone has a right to have the historical record set
straight. As the Liberty Lobby court noted, "[w]e are not yet
196. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977). The court said Buckley could "fairly be described as perhaps the
leading advocate, idealogue or theoretician of conservative political beliefs and
ideas." Id. at 886.
197. Id. at 884.
198. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
199. Id. at 303-04.
200. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1080-81 (3d Cir.
1988).
201. Id. at 1080 n.13. The plaintiffs argued that it was unfair to assume
they did not challenge the rest of the article because its allegations were true;
rather, they contended that they had valid reasons (including limited resources
and quality of evidence) for electing to challenge only the last portion of the
article, and that they had no intention of conceding that the rest was true. Id.
202. Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1182 (1986).
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ready to adopt for the law of libel the principle that 10,000
repetitions are as good as the truth." °3 Our judicial system
exists not only to provide monetary damages, but to resolve
disputes between parties "even if no more than personal
honor is at stake."2 °4 However, the United States Supreme
Court has limited the extent to which equal access to civil
adjudication may be claimed.2 °5 In Boddie v. Connecticut,2 °6
the Court struck down a state law conditioning the granting
of a divorce on the claimant's ability to pay filing fees.20 7 The
Court reasoned that because "the requirement that [the
claimants] resort to the judicial process is entirely a statecreated matter,"20 8 a state may not pre-empt the right to dissolve a legal relationship without giving all its citizens access

to the means prescribed for doing

S0.209

Nevertheless, in

United States v. Kras, 2 10 the Court refused to apply this rationale to indigents' filing of bankruptcy petitions, as bankruptcy is "not the only method available to a debtor for the
2 11
adjustment of his legal relationship with his creditors."
Professor Tribe notes that, given state and federal laws
against forcible self-help, judicial decision may be "the only
lawful mechanism for securing a binding determination
against a recalcitrant opponent in any case. "212 If libel plaintiffs are denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard, they
cannot effectively combat the attacks on their reputation, as
their opportunities for self-help may be severely limited.2 1 3
The Buckley court acknowledged that William F. Buckley
may have been eminently capable of answering false and defamatory attacks with the communications resources at his
command,21 4 yet still upheld his right to recover in a libel action.21 5 If a person of Buckley's political prominence, and
203. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
204. Marder, supra note 14, at 1011-12.
205. TRIBE, supra note 177, § 16-11.
206. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
211. Id. at 445.
212. TRIBE, supra note 177, § 16-11.
213. Marder, supra note 14, at 1012.
214. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977).
215. Id.
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with Buckley's access to the media, was not left to his own
devices to defend his reputation, why should anyone be? Socalled libel-proof plaintiffs have achieved their tarnished reputations through highly publicized crimes or anti-social
acts.2 16 Given their resultant low place in the public esteem,
their credibility may be so damaged that even if they have
access to channels of mass communication, they may be unable to change public opinion.2 1 7 As one commentator notes,
"[w]ith little capacity to make an impact on the marketplace
of ideas, such individuals have a strong interest in securing a
2 18
judicial forum, the best possible means of vindication."
By extension, without an effective opportunity to vindicate their reputations, plaintiffs held to be libel-proof may
never be able to restore their reputations. Even if years have
elapsed since the plaintiffs alleged bad acts, courts may deny
recovery on the basis that the plaintiffs reputation has not
been rehabilitated in the interim. 2 19 For example, the Second
Circuit decided that Robert Guccione had not restored his
reputation during the four years prior to the Hustler article,
because of the "long duration" of Guccione's adulterous relationship and the "relatively short" period between its end and
the article's publication. 2 20 However, the better view is that
of the Fifth Circuit, which agreed with the plaintiffs in Zerangue that whether or not they had improved their reputations during the six years prior to the publication of the allegedly libelous article was a question for the jury.2 21 Exconvicts who have served their time and wish to start a new
life, particularly if they move to a new community where
their past acts are unknown,2 2 2 should not be prevented from
protecting a fledgling good reputation merely because little
216. Marder, supra note 14, at 1012.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 304 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
220. Id.
221. Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1074 (5th Cir. 1987).
The defendants produced no evidence to refute the plaintiffs' contentions, but
simply claimed the arguments were not believable. Id. The court reasoned that
'summary judgment is not an appropriate stage at which to resolve credibility
questions." Id.
222. See Marder, supra note 14, at 1013. "[W]hat is to be done when a plaintiffs community does not know of the past convictions? What of the criminal
who has been rehabilitated and wants to start a new life?" Id.
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time has elapsed since their crimes were committed. Such individuals have a strong interest in protecting their ability to
be accepted as contributing members of their new
communities.
Without a judicial forum, persons about whom society is
mistaken have no recourse. In the case of Leo Frank, for example, Frank's reputation in his community led to his conviction for the murder of Mary Phagan.223 Prior to the trial, one
reporter wrote that "'the public has not yet become convinced-and may never become convinced-that Leo Frank is
innocent of the crime for which he has been indicted.'

'2 24

Gossip about the murder so inflamed the Atlanta populace
that some residents doubted an impartial jury could be assembled. 2 25

Had Frank attempted to bring a libel suit

against the newspapers reporting or inciting the gossip, and
had the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine existed at that time, a
judge could have declared Frank libel-proof despite his lack of
a criminal record. As the Brooks court noted, "[c]riminal convictions are the well-worn path to achieving libel-proof status, but a specific reputation obtained through means such as
newspaper and magazine articles also will suffice." 226 The

judge could have considered any false statements non-actionable if the judge considered Frank's past conduct sufficiently
anti-social,227 or the judge could have concluded that any actionable statements would cause only incremental harm be223. "One of the most infamous outbursts of anti-Semitic feeling in the
United States occurred in Georgia in the years 1913, 1914, and 1915. Leo
Frank, a Northern Jewish industrialist, was convicted of murdering a thirteenyear-old working girl." LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE Xiii
(1987).
224. Id. at 36 (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 36-37. The defense introduced over one hundred witnesses who
testified to Frank's good character. On cross-examination, the prosecution repeatedly asked whether these witnesses had heard of Frank's reputation for
lascivious behavior. "It mattered not how the witnesses responded. [The prosecutor] had already said enough to damage Frank's reputation... ." Id. at 51. At
one point during the trial, the prosecutor implied that Frank might be homosexual, and 'the insinuation that Frank indulged himself in this fashion 'went from
mouth to mouth gaining credence as it went.'" Id. (citation omitted).
226. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir.
1991). See also Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
227. See Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 928 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
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yond that caused by non-actionable ones. 2 28 Leo Frank could
not have countered these falsehoods without his day in court.
Frank was ultimately lynched, although evidence discovered
subsequent to his trial indicates that he was innocent.2 2 9
Precluding libel plaintiffs from seeking vindication may
not lead to their lynching, but certainly prevents them from
proving that public opinion may be unfounded. Suppose, for
example, that a man is in prison for rape and murder. The
local newspaper prints a story saying the man is also a child
molester. Assuming the man lived long enough to bring the
libel action, a judge might declare him libel-proof; however,
his reputation among the prison inmates could have been
damaged to the point where his physical safety, if not his life
itself, would be jeopardized. A judge may be unable or unwilling to assess the scope of damage to this plaintiffs reputation within the prison community, yet that is precisely the
community having the most direct impact on the plaintiffs
safety during his incarceration.
Without a trial on the merits, a judge cannot be certain
that a libel plaintiffs recovery would be minimal. The plaintiff may be entitled to damages for emotional distress, 23° and
to punitive damages even if the defendant has not acted with
malice. 2 3 ' Such awards may be far from nominal in amount.
During the 1980's, the median jury award in libel cases was
$200,000, but in the two years from 1990 through 1992, the
median award had risen to $1,500,000.22 Additionally,
"[r]ecent juries awarded punitive damages in three-quarters
of the defense [sic] victories. By contrast, in the preceding
decade punitives accompanied general damages in roughly
228. See Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1182 (1986).
229. "Frank was arrested and convicted for a murder that he could not possibly have committed but which most Georgians firmly believed he had." DINNERSTEIN, supra note 223, at x. In 1982, Alonzo Mann, the eighty-two-year-old former office boy in the firm Frank supervised, stated he had additional evidence
tending to exonerate Frank of the murder. Id. Mann claimed he had seen Jim
Conley, the state's main witness against Frank at trial, carrying a girl's body at
about the time Mary Phagan was murdered. Id. Conley reportedly threatened
to kill Mann if he ever mentioned what he had seen. Id. Mann, thirteen years
old at the time, returned home and told his mother, who advised him not to tell
anyone about Conley and the body. Id. at x-xi.
230. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
231. See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
232. Gail Diane Cox, Awards for Libel Show Big Rise, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 7,
1992, at 6.
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half the awards."2 3 Those publishers who can mount a sustained defense prevail in only about twenty-five percent of
their post-trial motions for reversals, new trials, or reduced
damages.2 s4 Given these trends, assertions that a libel plaintiff would be able to recover only nominal damages rest on
shaky ground indeed. Thus, the individual interests affected
by the libel-proof plaintiff classification include the plaintiffs
interest in setting the record straight in perhaps the only effective forum for vindication; the interest in rebuilding a
damaged reputation and protecting a new, good one; the interest in compensation for actual injury; and the interest in
punishing the defendant and deterring future wrongful
conduct.
3.

Governmental Interests Asserted in Support of the
Classification

In Cardillo, the Second Circuit justified the libel-proof
plaintiff doctrine on the grounds that Cardillo's case "involv[ed] ... First Amendment considerations"

2 35

without ex-

plaining why these First Amendment considerations were
particularly problematic if the libel plaintiff was a habitual
criminal. Although the Second Circuit found no such First
Amendment problems in Buckley,236 it explained in Guccione
that the cost of defending against a libel claim can impair the
defendant's "vigorous freedom of expression." 237 Additionally,
in Schiavone, the defendant argued that "the availability of
punitive damages against newspapers threatens the system
of a free and fearless press that is essential to democracy. "238
In Schiavone, the Third Circuit declined to rule on the constitutionality of punitive damages in cases where the jury
awards only nominal damages to plaintiffs, wisely electing to
"resist the invitation to play leapfrog in this constitutional
minefield."239
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir. 1975).
236. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977).
237. Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
238. Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1081 (3d Cir. 1988).
239. Id. at 1082.
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The First Amendment interests purportedly at stake in
libel-proof plaintiff cases are tenuous at best. As the Buckley
court noted, "'there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.'" 24 ° Recovery in libel cases is extremely difficult, even for plaintiffs not branded as libel-proof. 24 ' As thenJudge Scalia pointed out in Liberty Lobby,242 where a person
has been widely libeled by reputable sources, the defendant
publisher's good-faith reliance upon those sources provides a
complete defense.243 Judge Scalia did not consider either
proving such good-faith reliance, or merely preventing the
plaintiff from proving the opposite by clear and convincing
evidence, to be sufficiently burdensome that "a prophylactic
rule need be adopted sanctioning willful character-assassina244 Given
tion so long as it is conducted on a massive scale."

the weak justification for protecting publishers of malicious
falsehoods, the governmental interest in First Amendment
aspects of libel-proof plaintiff cases cannot be said to be compelling. Moreover, in Masson, the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected "any suggestion that the incremental harm doctrine
is compelled as a matter of First Amendment protection for
speech."245
Some proponents seek to justify the doctrine on the basis
that it "prevents the waste of judicial resources that would

24 6 Juoccur if courts permitted fruitless claims to go to trial."

dicial economy is a legitimate, if not an altogether compelling, governmental interest. As Professor Tribe notes, "governmental interest in efficiency, convenience, or cost-saving
may be cited in support of a challenged rule: strict scrutiny
would include judicial wariness of interests such as these
240. Buckley, 539 F.2d at 896 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 401 (1974)).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 24-35.
242. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated
on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
243. Id. at 1568.

244. Id.
245. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).
Presumably the Court did not mention the issue-specific branch of the libelproof plaintiff doctrine because the Ninth Circuit relied solely upon the incremental harm branch in its decision below. Id.
246. The Libel-ProofPlaintiffDoctrine, supra note 51, at 1917. "The libelproof plaintiff doctrine, when applied according to a clearly articulated set of
legal standards, assures that only plaintiffs with colorable reputational harm
go forward to the jury and thus permits courts to dispose of meritless claims at
an early stage." Id., at 1921.
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which can be so easily and indiscriminately invoked...
In his concurring opinion in Hudson v. McMillian,24 s Justice
Blackmun admonished that docket management issues have
"no appropriate role in interpreting the contours of a substantive constitutional right."24 9 In any event, given the relative

scarcity of cases involving the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, its
abolition probably would not open the floodgates of litigation.
Thus, applying strict scrutiny under an Equal Protection
Clause analysis, the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine cannot be
said to further a compelling state interest.
Even if the state interest were compelling, however, the
doctrine fails the second prong of the strict scrutiny test: the
doctrine is not necessary to the furtherance of the state's interest. Other means exist for conserving court time and protecting parties from frivolous litigation. As noted by the
Boddie Court, defendants can sue for malicious prosecution
or abuse of process. 250 Additionally, the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure permit courts to impose sanctions on attorneys or parties who sign pleadings, motions, or other papers
not filed in good faith.25 ' Under Rule 11, for example, a person signing a pleading, motion, or other paper in a case asserts (1) that he or she has read the document; (2) that to the
best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law (or by a good-faith argument for changing existing law); and (3) that the document is
not being filed for any improper purpose, including harassment or causing unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.25 2 Sections of Title 28 of the United
States Code authorize sanctions against attorneys who multiply the proceedings in a case "unreasonably and vexatiously,"
by pleadings or otherwise; 25 3 and against parties proceeding
in forma pauperis who file actions that are "frivolous or mali247. TRIBE, supra note 177, § 16-6.
248. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
249. Id. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Hudson considered a prisoner's

substantive constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 997.
250. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
251. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
252. Id.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
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255

expenses, 256 attor-

cious." 2 54 Sanctions can include costs,

neys' fees,257 and dismissal of the case.258 State courts have
similar sanctioning powers that serve to deter meritless
suits. 25 9 Accordingly, the libel-proof plaintiff classification violates the Equal Protection Clause because it abrogates a
fundamental right and is not necessary to the achievement of
a compelling state interest.
IV.

PROPOSAL

Because the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is judicially created, it can and should be judicially abrogated. From its inception, the doctrine was a "fundamentally bad idea";260 it

evolved into "a rather loose-woven legal conception of the federal courts" 26 1 that is both inequitable and unconstitutional.
Labeling a class of persons libel-proof denies them due
process and equal protection of the laws.262 Applying the
strict scrutiny standard for Equal Protection Clause analysis,
where a fundamental right such as due process is at stake,
governmental discrimination against so-called libel-proof
plaintiffs is invalid unless it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 26 3 Proponents of the libel-proof plain-

tiff doctrine assert that it somehow protects First Amendment freedoms,264 and that it promotes judicial economy by
preventing fruitless claims from proceeding to trial.265 However, the United States Supreme Court severely undercut
any First Amendment justifications by stating that the doc254. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1993).
255. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
257. FED. R. Crv. P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1993).
259. See, e.g., CAL.CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5(a) (West Supp. 1993), which permits trial courts to order 'a party, the party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay." Id.
260. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
261. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.
1991).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 179-260.
263. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971).
264. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
265. The Libel-ProofPlaintiffDoctrine, supra note 51, at 1917.
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trine "is not compelled
as a matter of First Amendment pro2 66
tection for speech."
Even if the governmental interest in precluding frivolous
litigation were considered compelling, the libel-proof plaintiff
doctrine is not necessary to promote that interest. Instead of
denying libel plaintiffs due process and equal protection,
judges can grant directed verdicts for malicious prosecution
or abuse of process to defendants who establish that the
plaintiffs' claims are truly meritless.26 7 As to the potentially
chilling effect of defense costs in libel claims, defendant publishers in federal court can use Rule 11 to seek reimbursement of their defense costs and attorneys' fees as sanctions if
the pleadings were signed without reasonable inquiry as to
their grounding in fact or in law, or if the pleadings were filed
for an improper purpose.2 8 Costs and attorneys' fees may
also be available as sanctions under Title 28, United States
Code § 1927 if plaintiffs' counsel multiplied the proceedings
to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously.26 9 In state
court, defendants can seek reimbursement of costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees under the state's statutes governing frivolous or vexatious litigation.2 7 0 Thus, numerous avenues are
open to libel defendants seeking to protect themselves
against meritless claims.
V.

CONCLUSION

The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine should be abrogated as
unconstitutional and inequitable. As one commentator
noted, "It]he rapist or corporate plunderer does not lose his
inherent worth as a person by committing the wrongful act
.... The accused, innocent or guilty, retains the right to be
heard in court." 27 1 So, too, should the libel plaintiff whose
reputation has been attacked. "Even a criminal or a cad may
have a vestige of honor that has been besmirched. It would
be consonant with general tort law to let the jury decide
266. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).

267. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
268. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.

269. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1993).
270. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC.

CODE

§ 128.5(a) (West Supp. 1993). Section

128.5(b)(2) defines "frivolous" as either "totally and completely without merit,"
or "for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE

§ 128.5(b)(2).
271. Collett, supra note 184, at 457.
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what, if any, harm was done to that sullied reputation. "272
Once the plaintiff has established that the defendant is a malicious tortfeasor, the jury should have broad discretion in
measuring the plaintiffs damages.17 ' Defendants can pursue

other remedies if they believe libel plaintiffs' actions are
274

frivolous.

If person X has $100 in her wallet and person Y steals
$99, X can sue Y for conversion. If X has $2 in her wallet and
Y steals $1, X can still sue Y for conversion. The courts do not
27 5 Simdeny X a remedy simply because X had little to steal.

ilarly, the courts should not deny libel plaintiffs an opportunity to present their case to a jury simply because a judge
subjectively decides the plaintiffs have little or no reputation
to lose. Such arbitrary and capricious denials protect publishers of malicious falsehoods and violate libel plaintiffs'
rights to due process and equal protection under the law.
Evelyn A. Peyton
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274. See supra text accompanying notes 251-60.
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